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FINANCING THE TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS
INTRODUCTION
1 The European Council meeting in Brussels in December 1993 .set in hand
three parallel exercises with respect ~o the trans-European networks:
the establishment of a group of personal representatives of Heads of
State and Government under the chairmanship of Commission Vice-
President Mr. Christophersen, to guide and accelerate the work on
transport and energy networks.
the creation of an ad hoc group of experts, under the chairmanship of
Commissioner Bangemann, to report on the information society and on
measures needed to facilitate the development of networks in the
information field;
a study of the obstacles to the financing of TENs in all three seCtors
as well as of the major environmental projects of Community interest
covered in the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment.
ECOFIN was specificallyinv.ited in this context to study, together with
the Commission and the EIB, how up to 8 billion Ecu a year of
additional .Iqans could be raised to meet the needs of project
promoters, without, however, undermining the efforts to reduce public
debt or compromising ~he stability of the financial markets. The
Conclusions of the European Council laid emphasis in this context on
the objective for the Community of mobilising larger amounts of private
finance for these projects by reducing their financial risks.
This paper addresses these financing issues. It concentrates on the
transport and energy sectors, drawing on the work of the "Christophersen
Group as weil as on the reflections undertaken by the EIB and contacts
between the Commission services and other financial institutions. It also
presents some preliminary considerations with respect to projects in
telecommunications, where, however, discussions on specific projects are
not so far advanced. It does not cover the financing of TEN investments
outside the territory of the Union. In agreement with the President of the
European Investment Bank, a complementary note from the EIB on
financing TENs is included as Annex 5.
It begins by reviewing the available information about the likely
requirements for finance (Section 2). It goes on to consider the possible
contributions from the public sector (including the Community budget) for
these projects and the scope under present circumstances for private
commitments (Section 3).- 2-
Section 4 considers first the potential problems in financing TENs. This
question can be addressed by reference to the aggregate volumes of
investment and corresponding financing requirements, and by detailed
analysis of specific projects. Since available information, however, is
inadequate to make a complete analysis of the aggregate volumes, the
paper focuses by way of illustration on the financing outlook for the ten most
mature priority transport projects.
Even for these selected projects, present evidence does not permit a
definitive assessment. But sc.enarios based on available information - for
these 10 projects alone - point to potential financing difficulties, possibly of a
significant scale. In the Commission s view, these indications are alarming
enough to invite Member States and Community institutions, as well as
private operators, already now to address with urgency the steps that need
to be taken to ensure the availability of finance, and especially sufficient
private finance so as to maintain an adequate pace of investment.
In view of the priority given by the Union and Member States to the.
implementation of trans-European networks and environmental
infrastructure, section 4 then goes on to outline some options for
complementary financing mechanisms at the Community level intended to
encourage and facilitate larger private commitments without breaching the
ceilings of the financial perspectives. These will require further and more
detailed examination in parallel with the further evaluation of the needs of
the priority projects themselves.
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCE
Volumes
1 The total investments needed for trans-European transport networks over
the period of the financial perspectives were tentatively estimated in the
White Paper at 220 Becu. Discussions between the Commission and the
representatives of the Member States in the working groups dealing with
common interest projects in the different transport modes have led moreover
to a broad estimate of total investment needs of some 400 Becu over the
period to 2010. These figures compare with the more modest overall
requirements forthe energy sector (around 30 Becu by 2000).
The most mature  transport projects listed at Annex 1 examined by the
Christophersen" Group represent only a fraction of these totals. But the
latest cost estimates for these projects based on data from the Member
States broadly confirm the expectations in the White Paper with respect to
them. Total investment costs for the first ten projects are now put by the
Member States at over 68 Becu in constant prices over their life-times (in
most cases up to 2002). This amounts to between 4 and 6 Becu a year for
the remainder of the century, depending on the phasing of expenditure (see- 3-
Annex 2). The real financial needs in outturn prices will, of course, be
higher; inflation of costs. by, for example, 2.5% per year, would raise the
total financing requirements to an estimated 75.;.80 Becu, once again
depending on the phasing. 
3 A summary of these figures , together with those for the most mature  enerav
projects, is given .at Annex 2. All the figures are being subjected to further
review with Member States and other interested parties through the project
seminars currently under way. But the Commission sees no reason, as a
result of the analysis so far, to regard the estimates given in the White
Paper as overambitious. Indeed, the opposite seems more likely to be the
case.
2.4 As far as  telecommunications are concerned, the White Paper proposed
three major development areas for the Information society:
the physical information infrastructure;
basic services;
new applications of common interest.
Priority was placed on the interconnectability of the networks and the
interoperability. of the services across Europe. Within this framework, a
number of actions will be proposed. For physical infrastructure, the
implementation of an integrated broadband network and the consolidation of
the ISDN network; for generic services, electronic mail, remote database
access and interactive video; and for applications, tele-working, tele-
training, tele-medicine, and tele-administration.
The investments necessary to implement the objectives of the White Paper
for the Information Society were estimated at 150 Becu for the next ten
years. The priority projects were estimated to require an investment of
67 Becu. A more precise evaluation is not possible at this stage. It is not
expected, in any case, that substantial public intervention will be required to
help finance these investments, for the reasons discussed in paragraphs 3.
and 3.
Special Characteristics
5 The "Christophersen" Group has emphasised that all the priority transport
and energy projects must satisfy the test of economic viability. They should
be expected to produce a substantial net benefit to society, taking into
account the external costs and benefits as well as the direct ones. They
should positively contribute to the competitiveness and the technological
development of the Community economy. In the transport field, this
requirement, however, does not mean that the projects will necessarily be
viable in strict financial or commercial terms, i.e. that their revenues will be- 4-
sufficient to cover all their costs and produce an adequate return to
investors without subsidy. Few of the transport projects are likely to satisfy
this test of pure financial viability. Estimated financial rates of return for
individual projects range from 3-8%, which means that some form of public
support will be required, unless external costs and benefits can be
internalised through user charges or other revenue-generating mechanisms.
This financial viability is influenced by several factors:
long, sometimes uncertain and expensive construction periods (6-
years or more is not uncommon) without any revenues to meet
financing charges. It is much more difficult for private sector investors
to get an early return on their investment than from industrial or
commercial projects.
These projects may be affected by a geographical asymmetry between
the benefits at Community level and the financial costs associated with
the externalities, especially the environmental impact, which occur
more regionally or locally.
For transfrontier projects, the need to satisfy different nalional
administrative and legal requirements.
On the revenue side, the single most important factor affecting
financial viability is uncertainty about traffic forecasts., both the rate of
build-up and the level of traffic flows.
In telecommunications, on the other hand, the situation is somewhat
different. The development of physical infrastructure requires heavy
investment, but this has so far proved to be highly profitable from a
commercial point of view. The greater uncertainties about commercial
viability apply to the development of services and applications, which will be
conditioned by access to the physical networks at acceptable prices and by
the opening up of new markets; in most cases, however, the investments in
services and applications enumerated in paragraph 2.4 above will be on a
smaller scale with more rapid completion than in the case of transport and
energy.
EXISTING SOURCES OF FINANCE
Public/Private Sector Partnerships
1 The White Paper noted that the major share of the finance needed for TEN
investments would be raised at the level of the Member States either
through public budgets, public enterprises or private investors and lenders.
Given the nature, of the projects in the transport sector, and for the reasons
discussed above, the public sector is likely to remain the most important- 5-
source of finance in transport. In energy and telecommunications, the
situation is different. Here the role of the private sector is already
established and growing in importance as a result of IiberaUsation
competition and privatisation.
Given the constraints on public budgets, which limit the scope for direct
financing of investment by the public sector, the rapid realisation of the
ambitious TEN programmes will, however, demand recourse to different
forms of partnership between private and public sectors also in transport.
The "Christophersen" Group, in conformity with the emphasis given by the
European Council in Brussels, has stipulated that the priority projects in
transport should allow scope for private involvement in a broad sense. Apart
from easing the burden on public budgets, private participation should
introduce competitive mechanisms, thereby improving cost-effectiveness in
project planning, construction and operation. Some Member States are
already developing approaches such as minimum bids for public budget
contributions through tender offers which are intended to minimise the
contribution from the public sector and maximise that from the private
sector. Possible forms of private involvement are: as a shareholder; as
operator of the project under a concession; as a risk-sharing contractor; or
as a provider simply of debt finance. One essential requirement is the
creation of an appropriate legal and administrative framework for risk-
sharing, including where necessary the granting of rights to build, own or
operate TEN projects. A second is a closer targeting of public sector support
so as specifically to facilitate private sector involvement. This targeting must
take into account the specific constraints on the supply of private money,
viz:
most private investors have a shorter time-horizon than the public
sector;
the levels of return which they require will be commensurate with risks;
they may be concerned, in the case of physical infrastructure projects
not simply with commercial risk but also "public policy" risk (changes in
legislation or future public investment decisions which affect viability).
Public Sector Budqets
3 As far as grant support is concerned Member States themselves will
provide the vast bulk of the necessary funding. For the 10 most mature
projects in transport, this seems likely on present planning to amount to
15-20 billion Ecu over the life of the projects (or between one-quarter and
one-third of total investment cost).
4 The Community also has a specific and complementary role, alongside the
Member States, in giving financial support for TEN projects of common interest. - 6-
For the Union territory as a whole, Article 129c of the Treaty foresees
Community resources especially for feasibility studies (pre-investment), for
interest subsidies on loan finance and for guarantees.
TEN projects in eligible regions are also financed by the ERDF and the
Cohesion Fund inasmuch as they contribute to the broader objectives of
these instruments in the context of economic and social cohesion. The
Cohesion Fund (with respect to environment and transport) and the ERDF
(in all the TEN sectors) can finance both grant aids and technical
assistance.
5 The Commission has already put forward to the Council and Parliament a
proposed Financial Regulation covering the expenditure (about 300 Mecu a
year up to 1999) from the specific TEN budget derived from Article 129c. I
The Commission s proposals are intended to permit the most effective use
of the limited funds available so as to facilitate access by these projects to
capital market finance and, where appropriate, to other forms of private
sector involvement. It proposes, notably, that promoters should seek the
most appropriate lending structure for a project, with the possibility,
however, of eligibility for help with interest charges equivalent to up to 10%
of the investment cost. It also proposes that the budget could help to meet
the costs of underwriting some of the lending arrangements by covering at
least a share of the costs of premiums on guarantees.
The transport projects, by virtue of their scale and their maturity, are likely to
need the greatest recourse to these latter instruments.
In the energy field, the Structural Funds will probably be an important
source of assistance for the realisation of projects in eligible areas.
Article 129c will be mainly used for the promotion of feasibility studies with a
view to speeding up the definition and the launching of less advanced
projects or to favouring the putting-together of finance for certain projects.
In some cases, for example, security of energy supply for one Member State
depends on the acceptance by other Member States of the construction of
the necessary networks. The Community support for the preliminary phase
of studies may constitute the catalyst for demonstrating the project'
feasibility.
In the case of telecommunications, the financing of trans-European network
(information society) projects will primarily be market driven and profitable.
Public investment will have a role to play, but it will refocus rather than
increase the level of public expenditure. Most of the investments to be
undertaken by public authorities are expected to generate major productivity
gains and an improvement in the quality of services which could lead to
Ref.: COM(94)62 final, 02,03.1994. Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general rules for the
granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks,.. 
savings in public expenditure. In addition, public involvement might 
necessary in order to playa catalytic role and in that case, its form will
depend upon the phase of the project, e.g. initial studies, feasibility studies
or actual implementation.
Aside. from recourse to funding for feasibility studies and other possibilities
offered by the TEN line, the telecommunications sector should be able to
benefit from Community R&D programmes and the Structural Funds. With
respect to individual projects here as in other sectors ~n appropriate co-
ordination among various sources of Community finance will be important.
Other Community Instruments
EIB
The largest single source of finance for the TENs at Community level will be
the EIB. In 1993 alone, it lent, through normal lending and its special
temporary lending facility ("Edinburgh facility
), 
some 7.5 billion Ecu to
projects of Community interest in transport, energy and telecommunications
as well as 3.5 bn to major environmental projects. Its role in support of the
TEN projects in general and the priorities in particular, will therefore be of
particular significance. The "Christophersen" Group has been able to
benefit from the advice of the EIB on the financing aspects. The
Commission welcomes the attention which the Bank is giving to this issue
and its commitment to making a major additional effort in support of TENs.
Specifically, the EIB has identified six areas where additional financial
efforts on its part may be useful in some cases, notably with respect to
transport projects, viz.
(i) Financing of Interest During Construction
The EIB already finances interest during construction as part of project
costs. It may be possible, with recourse to appropriate funding
arrangements, for the Bank to offer also lower rates during
construction, recouping the shortfall through capitalisation of interest to
be repaid over the life of a loan. Such a facility could provide a useful
complement to the availability of .interest subsidies from the TEN
budget line in reducing the debt service burden in the early stages of
projects;
Extended Grace Periods for Capital Repayment (ii)
TEN projects often also need to have an extended capital grace period
because of the absence of revenues during construction and the slow
build-up of positive cash-flow after operations begin. The EIB already
offers such facilities in some cases and it has in the past provided
bullet" loans, where capital is repaid in one lump sum at the end of the- 8"
life of the loan. The Bank is prepared to consider extending this
formula more widely to TEN projects.
(iii) Provision of very long Maturities
This is a further mechanism intended to minimise the amount of project
cash flow which has to be devoted to debt repayment in the early
years. The EIB is prepared to provide maturities in excess of 20 years
where this is suitable.
(iv) Fixing Loan Rates in Advance of Drawdown '
Advance funding enables project promoters to protect themselves
against any increases in interest rates that may occur between the
establishment of borrowing faciiities and the time that the borrowed
funds are needed to finance constr:uction or other costs. The EIB is
prepared to establish such facilities where formal commitments have
been made to implement the project and where there is a framework
agreement between the EIB and the promoter that the funds raised for
the promoter s benefit will be duly drawn down.
(v) Cofinancing of Project Debt
Many banks are prepared to provide construction finance but do not
wish to be tied into the project and take revenue risk over a long
period. They therefore wish to have arrangements to take them out of
the project when it is complete. The EIB is willing to, consider
structures provided that a framework agreement to this effect has been
put in place from the outset as an integral part of the financing
arrangements for the project.
(vi) Framework Credit Agreements
In the case of suitable projects, the EIB will be prepared to enter at an
early stage into a framework credit agreement under which it will
undertake to provide a substantial part of the finance required
provided that the project promoter meets certain commitments. The
amount will obviously vary with circumstances. Disbursements under
framework agreements are made through open rate contracts which
give the promo~er the possibility, without commitments fees, to draw
upon the agreed line of credit at the rate of interest prevailing on
capital markets at the time of drawdown (as distinct from the time of
the initial commitment).
In addition to these specific financing arrangements which should help to
attract other sources of finance, the Bank has also offered to playa role in
helping to structure the contractual and financing arrangements for priority
TEN projects, in collaboration with the promoter and its advisers, the- 9-
Member States, the Commission and other parties. 'The EIB's role would be
quite specifically to help to devise ways to limit the construction and
financing costs and risks 'of the project.
ElF
9 A further important contribution to facilitating access by these projects to
capital market finance should also come from the European Investment
Fund, which will now be inaugurated in June. The ElF will work with the
private sector and with public/private partnerships in helping to allocate and
manage risks. The ElF is intended to be a key co~financing partner with the
EIB and other financial institutions in the financing of TENs and SMEs,
within the financial ceilings set by its Statute and operating on the basis of
proper commercial principles. The ElF should encourage and facilitate
various forms of project finance, where debt is backed essentially by cash-
flow. This should in time draw institutional investors into these projects. It
should also be able to operate closely as . partner with Community
budgetary and financial instruments, facilitating their involvement in joint
private-public operations. It would be possible, for example, to envisage a
TEN financed partly with an EIB loan, partly an ElF guarantee (as on a third
party loan), partly with a contribution from the T~N budget line to the ElF
premium.
COMPLEMENTARY FINANCING
After reviewing the information presently available about the costs of the
TEN programmes, the Commission considers, however, that the existing
sources of finance will not be sufficient to cover all the financing needs of
the TEN programmes  if an adeQuate pace of investment is to be maintained
and their contribution to competitiveness, and hence to arowth and
employment is to be maximised. This judgement is shared by many of the
financial institutions contacted by the Commission services (Annex 3). Both
they and the EIB have emphasised, however, the considerable uncertainties
attached to all the estimates of costs of such large projects.
Of the total investments in transport TENs to 1999 of 220 Becu (para 2.
above) the Commission estimated in the White Paper that only some
90 Becu could come from budgetary resources (national and Community).
On the assumption that around one quarter of the remainder could come
from the private sector and railway companies (an assumption extrapolated
from the more detailed information available for the first set of projects),
additional finance of some 100 Becu is likely to be needed for transport
alone. The EIB consider that on present information they could be asked to
provide 2-5 bn Ecu a year for TEN investments in addition to their current
efforts. Even if the top end of that range were to be achieved, there would
remain a sizeable gap... 10-
The reasons for the Commission s concern about the availability of
adequate finance are highlighted by an analysis of the more detailed
information available with respect to the first ten most mature priority
transport projects. The scenarios presented below of the likely investment
needs and possible sources of finance for these ten projects up to and
including 1999 use aggregate figures built up from a case-by-case
examination. The assumptions underlying the figures are given in detail in
Annex 4.
Most Mature Priority Transport Projects - Financing Scenarios 1994-1999
Becu
Estimated Possible Max. likely Railway EIB Possible Potential
investment Government Community companies Hypothetical Private Shortfall
costs contributions contribution additional
(nat., reg. contribution
local)






The Commission has concentrated on the period to 1999, since this
corresponds to that of the financial perspectives and represents a
reasonable programming period for public expenditure. In fact, however
expenditure on most of these projects is currently scheduled to continue well
beyond 1999, with investment in many of them peaking in the years
1997 -2002. Heavy expenditure in the case of one project (the Brenner
tunnel and rail links) moreover could occur through to 2010 and even
beyond. The expenditure considered by the Commission in its scenarios
represents therefore less than half (32 Becu) of total estimated expenditure
over the life-time of construction of the projects (68 Becu).
Even for the period to 1999, however, the analysis reveals very major
uncertainties about how this group of projects will be financed. Taking
together the best available estimates of possible Government and railway
company expenditure; the maximum likely contribution from the Community
budget; and, compared with historical experience, optimistic assumptions
about private capital, there remains a sizeable potential financing shortfall.
Such a shortfall could not be covered by the EIB alone. The table reflects
three scenarios for hypothetical EIB involvement. These figures are purely
illustrative and do not represent commitments by the Bank. They only cover
those projects where sufficient other sources of finance are not foreseen.
The first (scenario a) is that the B~nk would be able to contribute up to 15%
of total investment cost for those projects in need of additional finance; this
percentage corresponds to existing EIB practice with respect to very large- 11 -
projects with similar technical, economic and financial characteristics. The
second (scenario b) is that the Bank would contribute up to 25% where
necessary, reflecting a specific additional effort for these projects. The third
(scenario c) reflects the formal ceiling of 50% that applies to all normal EIB
loan commitments (except those under its temporary lending facility). Even
in this latter extreme case, there remains a potential shortfall of
7.. 1 Becu. In the case of an EIB contribution of up to 15%, the shortfall
could exceed 6 Becu.
If the projects were to be accelerated, corresponding to the European
Council' s wish to ensure the rapid completion of priority investments, and
some of the heavy expenditure scheduled for the years 1999-2002 brought
forward into 1994-1999, the shortfall would be correspondingly greater.
The uncertainties about possible financing sources are magnified if the
whole period of construction is taken into account. On different assumptions
about public and private sector contributions, together with scenarios for the
EIB involvement, a potential shortfall of 7-20 Becu could occur.
If this analysis is confirmed by the further work on the individual projects, the
Community will face a choice between a slowing down of the pace of
investment or envisaging complementary financing mechanisms.
Loans and Guarantees
The constraints on the existing Community financial instruments derive both
from capacity and risk-spreading considerations.
4.4 In the case of the ElF, the initial capital base (2 billion Ecu when all the
subscriptions are taken up) combined with the need to establish itself in the
market, will limit both the amount exposure to individual projects and the
number of projects that can be underwritten at anyone time.. In the initial
phases of its operations, the Fund will not be able to carry more than 6 Becu
of loans on its books. Even later, the prudential ceiling has been set at
16 Becu on the present capital base. These volumes moreover are not
available for TENs alone, since the ElF also has a mission to support
investments by SMEs. In all cases, the ElF will work in close collaboration
with other market operators. The possibility of increasing the ElF's capital
could be envisaged later; this would require the agreement of each of its
groups of shareholders (the EIB itself, the other financial institutions and the
Community acting through the Commission).
For the EIB, the volume constraint is less serious. Member States have
confirmed that the Bank's first priority remains regional development and
they have already committed themselves, in the context of economic and
social cohesion, to look sympathetically at the need for a further increase in
the capital of the Bank should the development of operations warrant it. The
Bank considers that some additional effort .in favour of TENs could be12 -
undertaken, however, without bringing forward the date of a new capital
increase compared with that envisaged when the last increase was
sanctioned. The limits to EIB involvement seem less likely to derive
therefore from an overall capacity constraint than from the need to maintain
, a diversified portfolio. Prudent risk spreading is likely to limit the Bank'
ability to take dominant shares in the financing ofa wide range of very large
projects; more usually, the Bank will wish to seek appropriate and equitable
risk-sharing arrangements with other lenders.
In the case of the 10 most mature' transport projects, the average cost per
project is estimated at around 3-5 Becu. It is not reasonable to assume that
for such large-scale projects the Bank would be able to contribute up to its
formal prudential ceiling of 50% of project cost. Even in the case of
Eurotunnel, where the EIB is the single largest source of debt finance, the
Bank' s contribution amounts to less than 15% of total estimated project cost.
6 A limited number of co-financing arrangements have been possible in the
past at the level of the Community itself between the EIBand the ECSC
operating under Art. 54.2 of the ECSC Treaty (consumption of Community
steel), notably in the case of the financing of Eurotunnel. Such
arrangements will, however, no longer be possible after July of this year
following the recent agreement between the Commission and the Council to
halt Art. 54.2 lending as part of the arrangements leading up to the expiry of
the ECSC Treaty in 2002.
In these new circumstances, and depending' on the results of the further
work on the financing needs of individual projects, the Commission believes
that it will be necessary to consider some complementary capital market
funding at Community level alongside and in partnership with the EIB and
ElF, which must fully respect the ceilings on the financial perspectives.
Community intervention could also be viewed as a means of more equitable
sharing of the costs between Member States and regions, on the one hand
and the Community on the other.
There are two broad possibilities discussed further at Annex 6:
Special guarantees underwritten by the Community budget. Such
guarantees could be made ava!lable, within a predetermined ceiling, to
loans to specific projects co-financed by the EIB. As noted in para 3.4
above, the Treaty provides for the possibility of Community action in
the form of guarantees. Specific arrangements for co-ordination with
the ElF would have to be introduced including the possibility of joint
action.
Fund raising by the Community itself on the capital markets so as to
co-finance, with the EIB, loan packages to individual priority projects
where other financing sources are not available. In this case, the
proceeds of the Community loans would be managed by the EIB on- 13-
behalf of the Community in parallel with its own loans to the same
operations, which would be raised quite separately. Such operations
would also take place within a predetermined ceiling.
The practical arrangements underlying this approach would be designed so
as to avoid both breaching the Edinburgh ceilings and creating any overlap
between the financial competences of different Community institutions. In
short, the Commission would not itself become a financial institution. The
EIB would be invited to take on the necessary management tasks with
respect to the specific project interventions.
Under both options, moreover, decisions on support for individual projects
would only be taken in coordination with the Council.
9 The advantage of such co-financing arrangements, however, would be to
spread project risks between Community institutions. "Partnership" loans
from the Community would have the added advantage of increasing the
flexibility and the ease of funding on the markets as a result of using two
separate signatures. They would also represent a particularly powerful
signal to the market about the Community s commitment to the projects. At
the same time, however, the Community loans would have all the
underpinning provided by EIB management and the Bank's appraisal and
judgement about the technical and commercial aspects of the projects.
10 Normally, Community loans should attract the same creditor status as the
EIB' s own loans and the interest rates applied should then be particularly
fine. In certain circumstances, it might conceivably be of interest to package
the Community loans in other forms so as to facilitate the entry of other
financial institutions providing private finance on acceptable terms; these
might include loans linked to profit-sharing or other forms of quasi-equity.
But the risk and cost implications of any such innovative financing
arrangements would need to be most carefully weighed.
11 Complementary Community .guarantees or Community loans would be
contracted with individual project promoters. They would be treated, for the
purposes of compliance with convergence targets (Art. 104c of the Treaty)
on exactly the same basis as EIB's own loans. Any loans directly to either
public or private project promoters, including railway companies, gas
electricity, water or telecommunications operators, and which do not pass
via governments are not counted as government debt under Art. 104c.
Recourse to the Budaet
12 In addition to the question of loan finance, further consideration could also
usefully be given to the future role of the Community budget instruments in
facilitating the implementation of large-scale projects of Community interest.
The provisions of the TEN budget line will provide a useful catalyst. But they
provide no specific support to compensate for the financial costs deriving14 -
from the environmental impact in transit regions. For strategic projects of
Community interest, it might be appropriate to spread part of that cost to the
Community as a whole, provided that this could be done within the
framework of the ceilings on financial perspectives.
13 A further issue for discussion is the role which existing budgetary
instruments could play. within the terms of the legislation applying to them
in meeting specific financing gaps in the market alongside the traditional
form of grant aids without reimbursement. One major gap in the financial
market is  equity for long-term infrastructure investments. In the energy,
telecommunications and water sectors, large operating companies are
willing to provide risk capital for new investments. In the case of airports
there are some moves toward equity investments by industrial operators in
new or expanding operations elsewhere. For the Channel Tunnel project
equity has been raised exceptionally from the general public. But generally,
it has proved difficult so far to involve either contractors or suppliers to
projects as equity shareholders in the transport field, or to persuade
commercial banks or institutional investors to offer this form of funding.
Key reasons. for the absence of private equity funds are the slow and
inadequate returns (an equity investor who is in a subordinated position to
providers of debt finance naturally seeks a higher return), and the inability to
spread risks across a portfolio of projects. With a view to encouraging the
development of this market and a cost-effective use of public money, it may
be appropriate to consider whether, especially for private projects requiring
some public budget .support, some of that support itself might take on equity
features (e.g. reimbursable or profit-sharing grants). Such considerations
would apply to some forms of national as well as Community grant aid. In
the latter case, it might .specifically be considered whether the exceptional
funding of direct investment in TENs by the Community envisaged in Art. 5.4
of the proposed Regulation on financing the TENs2 could take the form 
grants with equity features.
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CONCLUSIONS
1 The detailed and ongoing work on the priority projects underscores the
large volumes of finance that will be needed. A share of these large
volumes will be available in the market-place to the extent that the financial
returns are sufficiently high as to meet the criteria of private investors. But in
many cases, the financial returns are likely to fall short of private sector
requirements despite the significant and wider benefits of the projects to the
Community economy.
For projects of interest at the level of the Community, the Community will
work alongside the Member States in helping to fill the financing gap at least
cost. The Commission welcomes the willingness of the EIB to make a major
effort to help, and it looks forward to an important contribution from the ElF.
If an. adequate pace of investment is to be maintained, however, the
Commission believes that it may be necessary and desirable for the
Community also to use its separate financial muscle to borrow on the
markets or to provide guarantee support, working in partnership with the
Bank, since EIB and ElF resources may well not be sufficient.
Further consideration needs to be given to the treatment, as far as financing
is concerned, of the externalities related to TEN projects, notably those
linked to the environment.
5.4 With a view to facilitating equitable partnerships between private and public
sectors in funding TEN projects and to optimising the catalytic effect of
budget money, it would be appropriate to consider the possibility of new
forms of intervention by budget instruments (e.g. reimbursable or profit-
sharing grants).
5 The Commission intends to develop these ideas further in the light of the
views of the Council, as well as of the EIB and the ElF, and taking fully into
account the results of the detailed discussions on the most mature priority
projects still underway. It considers that it is vital for the competitiveness of
the Community to ensure that there are no financial obstacles to the
acceleration of these projects. It will therefore come forward with the
necessary proposals when the evaluation of the priority projects is
completed.- 16-
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MOST MATURE PRIORITY TRANSPORT PROJECTS*
Brenner axis - rail tunnel and associated links
High Speed Train PBKAL
PBKAL Belgium
London Channel Tunnel access
PBKAL Netherlands
(Aachen )-Cologne-Rhein/Main
High Speed Train South
Madri d-Barce lona-P erp ig nan
Madrid-Vitoria-Dax
High Speed Train East
French part: Paris-Metz-Strasbourg-(Karlsruhe) including
sections Metz-Saarbrucken-Mannheim and Metz-
Luxembourg
German part: Munchen-Nurnberg-Erfurt-Halle/Leipzig-Berlin
Betuwe line (rail freight)
High Speed Train/Combined Transport France-Italy
Lyon-Turin




list established as.a result of analysis by the "Christophersen Group- \8-
Annex 2
TEN PROJECTS: ESTIMATED FINANCING NEEDS
FOR THE PERIOD 1994-2010
(Possible schedul.ing based on current plans .and available information)
in Becu




Transport first list of projects2 68. 31.
Energy list A
Total cost first list 73. 36.




Transport second list of projects
Transport third list of projects
Energy list B
Total cost second + third lists3
Including jAvestment costs to be incurred after 2010: BECU 3,
Assuming inflation of 2,5% p.a. total cost for transport first list in current prices of each year amounts to
81.7 for the whole period, and 36,2 Becu for 1994-1999.




RESULTS FROM CONTACTS  ITH  FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
Commission services have had recently extensive contacts with some of
the main intermediaries (commercial banks, investment banks) active in
project finance focusing on the priority list of transport projects with a
view to:
evaluate the costs of the TEN priority projects and
estimate to what extent  the  private sector would be ready to finance
the projects, complemented if necessary by public financing, and
what could be the remaining financial gap.
In sum the following answers have been received.
Most banks are of the view that 100 % private financing of TEN
projects is not a realistic option, taking also into account the
Eurotunnel financing experience and that available government
subsidies will not be sufficient to provide the balance leaving a "gap
to be financed.
Some of the priority projects are not sufficiently advanced to allow
for a precise evaluation of the overall costs. It may even not be
possible to complete or verify the figures communicated by the
personal representatives of the Heads of State and Governments
since, in most cases, the technical studies related to the projects
have not been completed.
Definitions
For the purpose of this paper we have defined "public" and "private" finance and the
gap" as having the following meanings:
a)  Public finance
Direct Member State, regional or local government subsidies and
contributions in form of equity or debt provided by State entities
and/or
Budgetary contributions from the EC including the structural and cohesion
funds and "TEN" line.
b)  Private finance
All forms of "non recourse" finance provided by the private sector (equity/debt) the
servicing of which is based exclusively on the revenues generated by the Project
itself.
c)  The RoaD
Balance of financing required when "public" and "private" finance as defined are
insufficient. Part of the gap may be filled by EIB lending to public and private
sectors and by ElF support especially for private sector loans. The remaining gap
could be covered by EC financing.2D-
Due to the fact that at present only few projects have been
envisaged to be realised under a public-private partneq)hip scheme
the distribution of the financial burden between the
governmentallpubliclEC-sector on the one hand and the private
sector on the other cannot be definitively determined until the
projects are more advanced. .
Answers to 1 (b) can only be found through analysing the projects on
a case by case basis. In particular the financing structure of each
project will be significantly affected by decisions of the governments
to provide for private participation in all or part of the projects and
the timing of such action.
A number of further points which emerged from discussions with the
banks may be summarized as follows
In certain Member States "national priority" projects are sometimes
different from those which have been presented in the framework of
TENs (e.
g. 
Italy, France, Germany). As a consequence, national
subsidies are expected to be allocated primarily to the former
leaving higher requirements for ECintervention in favour of the TEN
projects, in particular the cross-border sections linking national
networks.
Banks assume that most of the TENs projects offer financial return~
Insufficient to attract investment from the private sector without a
strong element of public subsidy. This is particularly the case for
TEN projects which entail large "construction" or "policy" risks that
the private sector is not able to bear.
Consequently timing will be an important element of, the funding
structure: It might be appropriate to fund the construction of a project
under public ownership and plan, from the inception, subsequent
total or partial privatizations when the project risk is reduced and
therefore a lower return will be required by the market.
In this respect projects may be more attractive if the infrastructure
when completed, is separated from the operating services, as, for
instance, separate ownership of rail track and rolling stock.
There is a general consensus in the banking community that the
total available private and public finance (from Member States, EC-
subsidies including contributions from the structural funds, the
cohesion fund and the TEN-line, EIB, ElF), will leave a financial gap
which could be bridged by the EC itself in order to realize the
projects.~ ::2.l-
The banks are aware that an EC intervention would only be
consid~red if other available finance is insufficient and if, as a
consequence, the project would not be realized.
Banks recognise, in the light of the Eurotunnel experience, that the
EC could playa considerable role as a catalyst in order to attract
additional private funds.
In addition to the "volume" gap a "long term maturity" gap would also
benefit from EC intermediation in projects requiring long "pay back"
periods. The availability of long term "fixed rate" funds is limited to
prime borrowers having access to public markets providing investors
with the necessary credit assurance and liquidity.
Banks mentioned their limited manpower ressources devoted to
project analysis and their great selectivity in bidding for advisory
roles. Some underscored the potential conflict of interest between
the role of advisor and lender.
There is a core of between 40 and 50 commercial banks which lend
on a global basis to such projects. Any specific project would also
attract additional lenders on a case by case basis broadening the
market commensurately.
Several banks have expressed the view that a useful option would
be to encourage the Member States to appoint, at very early stage, a
financial advisor, the cost of which could be assumed by the 
budget. It would considerably enhance the quality of the information
available and facilitate, early on, the determination of the need for
EC financial support. It has been confirmed by the banks that the
role ofa financial advisor could be separate from that of the banks
providing the bulk of the funding.2.2--'- Annex 4
MOST MATURE PRIORITY TRANSPORT PROJECTS:
FINANCING SCENARIOS 1994-1999 AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS
FINANCING SCENARIOS 1994-1999
Becu
Estimated Possible Max. likely Railway EIB Possible Potential
investment Government Community companies Hypothetical Private Shortfall
costs contributions contribution additional
(nat., reg. contribution
localf






The figures in the table have been aggregated from available data for the
individual ten projects. The base data are those supplied by the Member States
to the Commission in the framework of the "Christophersen Group . All the
data, including estimated costs are subject to significant margins of uncertainty.




Member States have provided information on estimated financing costs over
the period of project construction and, in many cases" on the phasing of
expenditure. In those cases where information on phasing has not been given
the Commission services have made estimates based on expected starting and
completion dates and on the experience of expenditure curves for similar
projects. The prices given by Member States are constant prices (i.e. they take
no account of inflation over the life-time of the projects). The base date for
these prices varies between 1992 and 1994. Total expenditure estimates
include some preparatory work already, undertaken in 1993.
Government Contributions
These figures are also taken from Member States' submissions. Where specific
data were not available, the Commission services have applied pro rata to the
expenditure for 1994-1999 the Government contribution currently envisaged by
the Member States for total construction period, or where this was not possible
an estimate reflecting conservative budgetary programming.-~-
Maximum Likelv Community Contribution
This figure comprises estimated maximum expenditure by the Cohesion Fund
the ERDF and the TEN budget line for these projects. It does n.ot imply that any
decisions have yet been taken on the specific am.ounts that may be made
available with respect to future expenditure. The figures include, however
some 380 Mecu .of funding already committed (including expenditure in 1993).
The total covers all the projects f.or which Member States have already made
specific requests for support, together with an estimate .of possible
contributions to other eligible projects.
Railwav Companies
The lower figure in the table is aggregated from informatian supplied by the
Member States. The higher end of the range includes an estimate by the
Commission services of possible further contributions for specific TGV projects
for which no specific information on railway company cantributions has been
provided. These contributions may take the form of own funds and/or .Ioans.
The figures given do not take into account any recourse by the companies to
EIB loans.
Hypothetical EIB Contributions
The three hypothetical scenarios far the EIB contributions are made purely for
illustrative purposes and do not reflect any commitments by the Bank; these
could only be made after further project evaluation and specific requests from
public and private promoters.
The hypothetical EIB contributions are made  .only for those projects where.
after taking into account other saurces of finance. a potential shortfall remains.
In some cases, this shortfall is smaller than the maximum EIB contribution
possible under one .or more .of the scenarios; in thase cases, the EIB
contribution has been limited to caverage of the potential shortfall. The
hypothetical Ela cantribution the ref .ore represents additional finance. 
practice, .of course, some of the contributions of public administrations, railway
companies and private operatars estimated elsewhere may in fact be funded by
recourse to the EIB; actual EIB lending could therefore be higher than that
given even under the ceilings envisaged. The first scenario (up to 15% .of
project cost where necessary ta meet the shartfall) is based on an extrapolatian
of the historical practice of the Bank with respect to very large prajects with
similar technical, economic and financial characteristics. The second scenario
(up to 25%) reflects the average level of contribution by the Bank to
infrastructure and ather projects as a whole; it also takes into account the
possible impact of the additional efforts which the Bank may be willing to make
for the priority TEN projects. The third scenario (up to 50%) reflects for
completeness the formal ceiling on EIB exposure to individual projects under its
normal loan operations.- Zq-
Possible Private Contribution
This includes private equity, bond issues and loans from the private sector. The
lower end of the range is based on the assumptions communicated by Member
States with respect to individual projects. The upper end of the range includes
an estimate by the Commission services of possible further private
contributions to projects for which private finance may be sought. The actual
volume of private finance will be affected in part by decisions of the Member
States on the .administrative and legal frameworks for individual projects, and
by the availability and conditions of public finance as well. as the inherent
viability of the projects. The figures given in the table are high compared with
experience in most Member States with respect to transport projects.
European Investment Fund
The table does not identify a specific "contribution" from the ElF since this will
take the form of guarantees rather than loans or grants. These guarantees can
be expected to be made available with respect to .loans to, especially, private
operators. The presence of the ElF will be one element in helping to facilitate
the possible private contributions presented in column 6.NOTE FROM EIB . z.$- ANNEX 5'
May 1994
EIB Financine: for TENs projects
Introduction
Financing infrastructure projects in transport, energy and telecommunications
is an essential part of the EIB's existing lending activity, and it has been reinforced by
the introduction of the Edinburgh Facility,
In the 6 years to 1993, lending for projects of Community interest in transport
energy and telecommunications amounted to ECU 25.6 billion. Of this, ECU 23.
billion was within the Community and a further ECU 2.4 billion in Eastern and
Central Europe and other countries contiguous to the Community. It accounted for 30
per cent of all EIB lending, and 72 per cent of it was in regional development areas.
The recent year-by-year figures are ECU 4.4 billion in 1991', ECU 5. 6 billion in 1992
and ECU 7.6 billion in 1993. Further details are set out in the Appendix.
Projects of Community interest in the three sectors are a wider group than the
Trans European NetWorks. Many of them, however, contribute directly or indirectly
to the development of the main TENs netWorks. In any case, from this starting point
the Ern is committed to making a major additional effort in support of TENs, focusing
in particular on the priority projects which have been identified.
General principles
The general principles which guide the EIB's consideration of TENs projects
are as follows:
(i) The EIB has no preference for public projects over private projects or vice
versa. Each TENs project is evaluated on its merits, taking account of netWork
benefits where identifiable, to establish that it is economically and fmancially
viable,
Economic viability is necessary to ensure that, in supporting European
integration, investment in TENs is not at the expense of economic growth. The
criterion of economic viability however includes, as appropriate, cost-benefit
components different from those which figure in conventional fmancial
analysis, F or example, the external benefits (or costs) arising from
decongestion and environmental aspects are taken into account and subsidies
are not taken as a deduction from the costs of the items subsidised.
Financial viability is necessary since prospective cash flows must be sufficient
to provide a satisfactory financial rate of return to those who provide the(ii)
(iii)
2.6~
capital employed. In general the private sector has more stringent and shorter
tetID requirements as to financial viability than the public sector.
Each TEN s project should ~neet an identified need for capacity in the network.
Projects should be technically viable and must of course accord with
Community policy, including Community requirements in respect of
intemational tendeling and the environment. The EIB is particularly concerned
to ensure the inter-operability of the networks and, while fully supporting the
priority curently being given to the, development of high speed rail networks
an appropriate balance in the development of different modes of transp0I1 over
time,
The Member States may need to take specific action to accelerate works on the
TENs projects in so far as these projects await the completion of feasibility
studies, authorisations, and administrative and technical approvals. The
complexity and, in some cases, slowness of the administrative procedure
required to obtain all the necessary authorisations are major sources of
concem. Development of the networks may even require changes to the
existing administrative and legal arrangements in some cases, including an
extension of the right to build, own or operate TENs projects, if the Member
States wish to extend private sector participation. Moreover, changes in the
public sector s approach to co-ventures with the private sector may be
necessary as well as pennissions if the private sector is to be induced to enter
into financial paJ1nerships with the public sector for the development of
transp0I1 infrastructure. Making such arrangements can cause delay, and it is
the various sources of delay that are the main obstacle to progress at the
moment; finance is not the immediate problem.
(iv) The financial and economic benefits of certain TENs projects will be all the
greater if these projeCts are executed in stages over a period within an agreed
planning, economic and operational framework. Such a process of staged
development with appropriate sequencing and timing can help to contain costs
and prevent the creation of bottlenecks in supplying industries. There may
however also be projects which yield their highest net benefits if they are
completed quickly.
Public and Private Finance
Changing role of the Public and Private Sectors
Traditionally major infrastructure projects have been financed almost
exclusively by the Public Sector. This is likely to remain the case for the majority of
the TENs projects under consideration, particularly in the transport sector, unless, on
closer examination, or by reason of the tariff policy or .financiai structure chosen
financial rates of return turn out to be substantially higher than seems to be the case at
the moment. Nevertheless there will be a number of transport projects in which the- '
.21--
private sector will be able to playa significant role either (i) as a shareholder, (ii) as a
provider of debt finance, (iii) as an operator of the project under a concession, or (iv)
as a risk-sharing 'contractor.
The latter role is the principal one which the private sector has played to date
in the transportation sector. . By contrast the role of the private sector lQ the energy
and telecommunications , sectors has become much bigger following the
comprehensive programmes for de-regulation, competition and privatisation that are in
train in a number of Member States, The financial reqllirements of promoters in tile
energy and telecommunications sectors have been highly varied, and the role of the
private sector in the development of these networks has varied accordingly. The EIB
is a significant lender to both the private and the public pat1icipants in these sectors
and it is prepared to continue in this way, guided by the economic and financial
characteristics of individual projects rather than by any a priori preference for one
sector or the other.
The public and private sectors both have essential roles to play in the
development of TENs, partkularly in transport. The specific responsibilities of each
will however vaty in each project in response to the priorities of the Member State or
States concell1ed and the characteristics of the project itself.
In order to expand the cunent limited role of private investment in transport
infrastructure it will be necessary to identify specific roles for the private sector as a
partner to the public sector.
One role could be as a provider of equity finance whether independently or in
partnership with the public sector. The scope for this may however be limited
because equity from the private sector is nonnally too expensive to be used
extensively for finance of transp0l1 infrastructure. Much would of course depend on
the individual project. In general, the higher are the perceived risks, the higher are the
returns that prospective new equity subscribers expect. In the present case
expectations should be of returns on equity of the order of 20-30 per cent per annum
in order to attract finance from the private sector from the outset. The high cost of
equity derives partly from .the uncertainty of profits, which means that there is a high
risk premium, and partly from tax considerations since dividends are payable out of
after-tax profits, In any case, equity is not always available for infrastructure projects
, even on optimistic assumptions, little or no profit is in prospect.
Another role for the private sector could be as a source of senior or
subordinated debt, the repayment of which would be dependent on project
perfonnance, The private sector may be prepared to partner the public sector in such
arrangements, provided that it can be satisfied that the project will be completed and
that the net revenue stream is likely to be adequate to repay the debts incuned. The
requirements of the public sector would also have to be met in thes~ cases,.,28'-
Finat1cing of this kind will become more attTactive as opportunities for 
become more plentiful and it becomes possible to think in teIIDS of a portfolio in
which the risks of any single investment are balanced by the other projects in the
portfolio. As yet however, with private involvement in transport infrastructure still at
an early stage within the Community and the role of public sector bodies still largely
predominant. the private sector has not had the opportunity to develop a portfolio of
transport projects in the way that is now becoming more widespread in the energy and
telecommunications sectors.
The quality of management whether by the public sector or by the private
sector will be an essential factor in the successful development of the TENs,
Management skills generally need to be of a higher order in the case of major projects
where mistakes can have very expensive consequences, The EIB has had good results
in the case of projects which were neither exclusively public nor wholly private, but
which combined the public management of some stages or functions with the private
management of others,
Economic and re2ulatory environment
The energy and telecommunication sectors are in general able to finance their
activities from public and private sector markets on an ongoing basis as the prices 
their products and services have been established in a competitive open market. The
operations of these markets have become increasingly transparent, as a result of the
efforts of Member States and the Community to ensure increased competion there.
In the transport sector matters are not so straightforward and the objectives of
Member States to attTact private finance into transport infrastructure may not be ful1y
realised unless steps are taken to ensure that the private sector has a realistic prospect
of earning a financial rate of return which is satisfactory in comparison with the
alternative investment opp0I1unities available, One element in this is to ensure that
transport users make appropriate payments for the use of transport facilities, which is
in any case desirable on economic grounds. 
Though there is a move in the direction of increased private sector involvement
in financing transport infrastructure, it is likely to be some considerable time before
private involvement becomes a generalised feature of transport infrastructure
financing. In the interim, the private sector may be restricted to playing a subordinate
role or to limiting its involvement to the financing of particular phases of a project
where the financial rates of return are sufficiently high.
Financin2 Issues on TENs
Current Status of the TENs projects
On the basis of the information available to the EIB at the present time, it
seems that, in the case of a number of the TENs projects submitted by the Member- 11 -
States, some key preparatory stages remain to be completed in the next two' years 
so. Significant progress must therefore be made by the Member States concerned to
advance work rapidly on design, planning and administrative issues and where
necessary, legal or parliamentary authorisations. The question of financing can only
be decided when these steps have been taken.
Economic and financial viability
The projects identified in the TENs list have been selected on the basis that
they are important projects which are already under consideration and capable of
being implemented in the short/medium teml. : they have not been ranked on the basis
of maximising economic benefits. Economic and financial viability is as yet uncertain
in a number of cases on the basis ofthe preliminary infonnation which is available.
General financial considerations
It will be essential to limit the construction and financing costs for each TENs
project to the extent possible, given that any substantial increase in cost could
materially undennine the already modest economic and financial viability of many of
the TENs projects,
1. Control of construction costs
Constl1lction costs are going to be the major cost element for TENs projects, It
is therefore particularly important, if overall costs are to be controlled, that maximum
eff0l1s be made to manage and .control these costs. Some elements -for example
general inflation ':are out of the project manager s hands, Such elements apm1
however, adequate time to prepare and define projects before construction begins is a
key element for success,
Construction costs can be materially influenced not only by the technical
characteristics of the project but also ' the contract and procurement strategy adopted
and the specific contractual arrangements entered into, Ensuring that there is
international competitive bidding is part of this; but it is also important to plan an
appropriate stl1lcture of contractual relationships at an earlier stage, A proper
contractual structure will be insufficient by itself however, unless adequate
allowances have been made for costs and contingencies from the outset.
Every project necessarily has impacts positive and negative, on the
environment, just as it necessarily has impacts, positive and negative on particular
geographical areas, Environmental features are therefore an inherent part of the costs
to be controlled and financed in each case.
Environmental concems now take up a major part of the: time required for
planning authorisations in Member States and they can be a considerable factor in the
overall construction cost. Promoters of TENs need to be told from the outset what30-
their responsibilities are in respect of the environment so that they can build this item
into their plans in an appropriate way. Though base cost estimates may be higher as a
result of taking such factors into account, these estimates will be better founded and
promoters will be in a better position to decide whether to proceed and if so how to
manage their projects.
Containing total costs is not the same as containing the costs which fall on
national budgets. Some governments have already taken action to protect the public
budget from increases in project costs by a paI1ial transfer of risks to the private
sector: This solution may be pursued further in the case of particular TENs projects
where the private sector can be given a more significant role, There is obviously a
risk that cost ovelTUns on TENs projects could ultimately fall on the public sector
unless specific measures are taken to prevent this from happening.
2.  Minimisin~ financin~ costs
In general, minimising financing costs would mean choosing the appropriate
capital structure, given the risks of the project, negotiating the lowest possible interest
rate in respect of debt and accepting as little equity as is possible, since the cost of
equity is so high. Outright subsidies are particularly appropriate in the case of
projects which yield significant environmental or other external benefits which cannot
be captured by the promoter. Loans provided by public authorities or under public
guarantee are nonnally the least expensive forms of debt, and subordinated public
sector loans and guarantees are particularly valuable as a means of helping difficult
projects. Though other fonns of debt may also be needed (syndicated bank debt, bond
market debt, mezzanine debt with equity features, financial leases, etc), the proportion
of these instruments in the overall financing should be kept as low as possible as they
will in general be of significantly higher cost. EIB loans have an important part to
playas they are nonnally the cheapest source of non-sovereign lending,
In general the cost of finance for projects supported by a public sector
guarantee will be substantially less than that for projects where repayments/security is
based on a single project without public support. Based on experience to date and on
standard credit considerations, it is likely to prove difficult, if not impossible, for
projects without a public sector guarantee to obtain an investment grade rating i.
BBB or better. The maturity of such financings would in the absence of public
support nonnally be limited to 10- 15 years. The general inability of single asset
companies to achieve credit rating of investment grade, emphasises the importance
that partnership between the public and private sectors and a private sector portfolio
investment approach could bring to reducing financing costs. If the promoter were a
diversified existing company with extensive project experience the terms and
conditions on which it could obtain finance would be considerably better.- 3.\-
4.4. Aeereeate demand for EIB loans forTENs pnHects
Though the estimates to date have been calculated in tenus of constant cost
rather thanoutum cost, adequate funding is expected to be available to finance the
TEN~ projects, provided that they promise to be viable. One of the key sources of
finance should be the cash flow available from the promoters themselves. In addition
national, Community, industry and other private sector sources of funds can all be
called upon,
EIB loans have already been approved or are under consideration for some of
the projects on the TENs list, and lending for other TENs projects has already been
envisaged in the EIB's medium tenu business plan, On this basis, and taking into
account the analysis emerging from the work of the Christophersen Committee, the
EIB' s present expectation is that the  additional funding for TENs projects which it is
likely to be asked to provide during the next few years, will be of the order of ECU2-
5 billion a year (ECU 16-40 billion over the 8 year planning horizon), This would not
be seriously out of line with the rates of lending experienced by the EIB in the recent
past ; and it would remain within the headroom which the EIB expects to have
available during the next few years under its capital ceiling.
The question of headroom will, however, need to be kept under
continued review as updated financing requirements for the TENs programme become
available and as specific decisions are made in respect of the financing of each
project. Should the Bank need to increase its bolTowing powers to enable it to
continue to support economic and social cohesion to an appropriate extent, the
Member States have already indicated in the Protocol on Economic Cohesion which
fonus part of the Maastricht Treaty that they are prepared to increase the capital of the
Bank to enable it to do so. 
EIB FinanCial Instruments for TENs projects
The EIB has maintained from the outset that the appropriate approach for the
financing of TENs projects is to review the requirements of each project individually.
Although the technical and economic criteria applied by the EIB for appraising
a project are the same whether the project is in the private sector or the public sector
the EIB will of necessity distinguish between the credit characteristics of the two
sectors in order to respect its banking criteria, Therefore, although the EIB is capable
of providing considerable flexibility in the case of TENs projects where these are
financed by the public sector, the EIB's approach to financing the private sector will
of necessity be structured, as the private sector will itself expect, to ensure that the
EIB's creditworthiness requirements are met. Creditworthiness is of course very much
enhanced when projects have a sound financial stTUcture and cash flow.- 32.-
The EIB seeks adequate security for its loans to comply with its Statute and
maintain its triple A rating for the benefit of the public and private project promoters
to whom it lends. Its loans are spread almost equally between the public and private
sectors and the security anangements are in each case detennined by the
characteristics of the project itself, the strength of the promoter and, in general, the
repayment prospects, The security. alTangements accepted include public sector
guarantees, bank guarantees, corporate guarantees and, in appropriate cases, charges
On project revenues and assets. As paI1 of its general policy, the EIB requires a
guarantee that the promoter will complete the project. Security for the EIB's loans
after completion can comprise a mix of public and private guarantees and charges on
project assets,
The EIBs existing lending capabilities are well suited to the requirements of
most, long tenn infrastructure projects. Moreover, the EIB is prepared ' to tailor the
financing which it provides to the specific requirements of individual TENs projects
where the characteristics of these projects show a need for such arrangements and an
ability to bear their costs and the colTesponding resources are available from the
financial markets,
Lending by the Bank does not nonnally exceed 50 per cent of project costs
(exceptionally up to 75 per cent under the Edinburgh Facility). In practice however
although its contribution could be very substantial in absolute tenns, the Bank would
be unlikely to approach these limits in the case of very big projects both on grounds of
prudence and because neither the public nor the private sector would want any single
source of funds to have such a dominant role in the financing,
Six areas where additional financial effort may be useful for TENs projects are
identified below. If projects are viable in economic and financial tenns, they will
only very rarely require flexibility on all of these points. Indeed a conventional mix
of medium and long-tenn finance will probably be sufficient for many TENs projects..
Financin2: of inter.est durin2: construction
The EIB finances interest during construct~on as part of project costs.,
Moreover, in the case of TENs, the EIB is prepared, in principle, to arrange matters
using the range of modem financial instruments available, so that interest costs are
particularly low during the construction period, the shortfall below the nonnal interest
rate being recouped over the life of the loan.
Provision of an extended capital 2:race perioll
TENs projects need to have an extended capital grace period so as to fit in with
the slow build-up of positive cash flow after operations begin,
In appropriate cases, the EIB is already providing extended grace periods
which cover the interval until the project is cash flow positive; and it has provided- 3~-
bullet loans for very substantial amounts. The EIB will consider extending its
application of this fonnula for TENs projects, in, order to match the cash flow profile
of the project and the promoters' resources.
Provision of lone maturities
Some TENs projects may require very long maturities in order to match the
slow build-up of cash flow from operations. The principal purpose of a lengthy
repayment schedule is to minimise the amount of project cash flow which has to be
dedicated to debt repayment in the early years. The EIB has already provided
maturities in excess of 20 years on occasion, and it is prepared to extend this facility
in suitable cases. One of the most uscful instruments available to the Bank in the case
of long maturity loans is revisable rate contracts; and the Bank will he able to apply
such contracts in the case of most currencies.
Fixine Loan Rates in Advance of Drawdown
Advance funding enables project promoters to protect themselves against any
increases inintere~t rates that may occur between the establishment of borrowing
facilities and the time that the borrowed funds are needed to finance construction or
other costs, The EIB is prepared to establish such facilities where formal
commitments have been made to implement the project and where there is a
framework agreement between the EIB and the promoter that the funds raised for the
promoter s benefit will be duely drawn down.
Cofinancine of the project debt
Many banks particularly in North America, are prepared to provide
construction finance but do not wish to be tied into the project and take revenue risk
over a long period, They therefore wish to have arrangements which take them out of
the project when it is complete, The EIB is willing to consider such arrangements
provided that they are embodied in a framework agreement which has been put in
place from the outset as an integral part of the financing arrangements for the project.
6.  Framework Credit Aereements
In the case of suitable projects the EIB will be prepared to enter at an early
stage into a framework credit agreement under which it will undertake to provide a
substantial part of the finance required, provided that the project promoter meets
certain commitments. The amount will obviously vary with circumstances,
Disbursements under framework agreements are made through open rate contracts
which give the promoter the possibility, without commitment fees, to draw upon the
agreed line of credit at the rate of interest prevailing on capital m~kets at the time of
drawdown (as distinct from the time of the initial commitment),. 3t-
Role of the ErR in TENs
The substantial commitment which the EIB is prepared to make to the
development and financing of TENs which are financially and economically viable
could extend beyond the provision of long teRTI finance. For example, the EIB'
supp0l1 for a project is frequently sought, particularly by the international banking
community, as a demonstration that the project is of Community interest
More concretely, the EIB can act as a catalyst, drawing in other financial
institutions to co-finance the project, based on their perception of the soundness of the
EIB's project appraisal system and reputation for financial prudence, The EIB's role
in co-financing can vary with the requirements of the individual project In general
the EIB has financed the longer maturity debt required, while the other parties have
provided shan to medium teRTI debt, subordinate debt and leases. In co-financing
alTangements the promoter can achieve particular contractual or financial
alTangements which are necessary in the interests of the project if the EIB makes these
alTangements a condition of the its financing commitment
In some cases, it may well be useful for the EIB to playa role in structuring the
contractual and financing alTangements, This would be with the aims of mini11lising
the overall risks of the project and ensuring that the financing is structured in such a
way as to maximise the chances for the project's success..
This would mean that the EIB would be prepared to work closely with the
promoter and its advisers, the Member State, the Commission and other parties, as
relevant, from an early stage in the project to structure the financing and contractual
alTangements so as to meet the different objectives of the various parties in a
satisfactory way. The EIB's role would be to help to limit the construction and
financing costs and risks of the project and ensure that the financing alTangements
were adequate to meet its likely requirements, The EIB is prepared to make this
commitment to TENs in view of their overall importance; it is not at the moment
able to extend this to the rest of its activities on a general basis,
Role of European Investment Fund
The ElF has been established by the EIB, the Commission and public and
private sector finance institutions to provide additional financial capacity for the
development of TENs networks as well as the development of small and medium
sized industry, The role of the ElF will be to provide guarantees to lenders and
investors in TENs and SME,
The ElF will work with the private sector as well as with public and private
sector partnerships and their financiers in the development of TENs, as its prime role
is to cany risks that the private sector by itself is unable to bear. For this service the
ElF will require a fully commercial rate of return. In order to ensure its success as a- 35/
financial institution, the ElF will need to ensure that the projects it guarantees are
structured, managed and financed in ways which will minimise the risk of loss.
Though it is not for the EIB but for all the shareholders of the ElF to detennine
what the precise role of the ElF will be, it can safely be said that the ElF will operate
to improve the allocation of lending risks. In the case of TENs, where monetroy
exposures are large and have long maturities, the intervention of the ElF, like that of
the EIB itself. will bring about some relaxation of the capital-adequacy constraints
that lenders face and thereby make room for additional lending. In addi~ion, by
making lenders more familiar with high-quality debt backed by projects' cash-flows, it
could draw institutional investors into the financing of TENs.
The ElF will be a key co-financing partner with the EIB and others in the
financing of TENs, The ElF will nevertheless have to develop its portfolio of projects
gradually OWl' time so as to ensure a proper control of risks. The ElF will, at least in
an initial de\'elopment period, spread its commitments over a range of projects while it
develops its own activities and makes its guarantee well known and, widely accepted
in the market.
Annex: '1h--
List of projects financed in the Member States from  1991 to 1993




Construction of French border - Brussels section of  new TGV line 
Channel Tunnel
Electrification and modernisation of Nyborg-Odense rail line
Modernisation of rail infrastructure on Athens-Thessaloniki-
Idomeni (northern border) line
Modernisation of inter-city rail links .andimprovements to
metropolitan rail networks in Madrid, Barcelona and
Valencia
Construction of high-speed rail link between Madrid and
Seville
TGV-Nord line between Paris and Belgian border, with
branch to Channel Tunnel
Improvement and modernisation of rail system, especially
on Lisbon-Oporto lines and on lines to Spain
ROADS AND MOTORWAYS
Motorway sections: Arhus - Alborg, Velie - Horsens
(Northern Jutland) and Ringsted - Skovse (Sjaelland)
on motorway linking Copenhagen and the Great Belt
Motorway suspension bridge  on  eastern section of Great
Belt fixed link
Upgrading to motorway specification of Varibobi- Yliki
section of Athens- Thessaloniki highway
Corinth- Tripoli motorway and Megalopoli bypass
Upgrading to motorway specification of Elefsina-Corinth
section of Athens-Corinth highway
Peresteri-Panaghia section of main East-West highway in
northern Greece (via Egnatia)
Construction of several sections of major trunk roads
Motorway section between Castelldefels and Sitges, south






















Construction of several sections of expressway on
France-Portugal and Madrid-Lisbon trunk roads
A16 motorway, I'lsle-Adam - Amiens section
A39 motorway. Dijon - D61e section
A26 motorway. linking Channel Tunnel with South of
France: Chalons-sur-Marne- Troyes Nord section
A29 motorway. Le Havre - Yvetot Est
A40 motorway, dualling of Chamoise tunnel and
Nantua and Neyrolles viaducts
A43 motorway, Montmelian-Albertville section
A49 motorway, Voreppe-Bourg de Peage section
Tunnels" motorway: sections towards Domodossola
(Swiss border)
Automation of toll system on part of motorway
network
Improvements to various sections of national road
network
Extension of motorway between Palmela and
Marateca and construction of Lisbon outer ring road
Motorway bridge over Severn estuary
Road improvement works in Hampshire
PORTS
Modernisation and rationalisation of ferry service
between Helsing0r (Denmark) and Halsingborg
(Sweden)
Construction of new terminals and redevelopment of
old harbour area in Barcelona
Extension of port of Bilbao
Extension of port of Valencia
Construction of second ferry dock in port of Caen-
Ouistreham
Construction of new container terminal at Belview
Development of "Toscana" dock in port of Livorno
for container vessels
New terminal at port of Setubal




























AIRPORTS AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Upgrading and harmonisation of European air traffic
control systems
Flight simulator at Copenhagen airport
New terminal at Frankfurt am Main International Airport
New international airport at Erding, north-east of Munich
New terminal at Hamburg International airport:
maintenance facilities for wide-bodied aircraft
Improvements to air traffic control system
Construction or extension of passenger terminals at
Palma de Mallorca (Balearic Islands), Barcelona and
Malaga airports
Modernisation of air traffic control system and airport
facilities in Lisbon, oporto, ponta Delgado and Horta
Extension and modernisation of Bologna airport
Extension and modernisation of Caselle- Turin airport







Development of digital switching and fibre-optic
transmission system
Setting up of DFS Kopernikus satellite transmission
system and telemetry exchanges
Extension of network in Rostock, Leipzig, Magdeburg,
Halle, Dresden and Gera
Modernisation and extension of network
Extension and modernisation of radio and television
broadcasting network, including launch and operation of
two telecommunications and television satellites
Commissioning of mobile telephone networks
Extension and rnodernisation of network














































Modemisation and development of trunk network
in central and northern Italy
Installation of terminals and antennae for transmission
of data by satellite; national control centre in Fucino plain
Acquisition and launch of broadcasting satellite
Extension of network
Development of mobile telephone network throughout the
country
Undersea fibre-optic telecommunications cable between
Portugal. Made.lra, France and Morocco
Extension of rwtwork in Northern Ireland
Extension of natIOnal network and provision of undersea
cable links with continental Europe
III. ENERGY SUPPLY AND  DISTRIBUTION
ELECTRICITY
Power cable connecting Denm~rk and Norway
Extension and upgrading of transmission and distribution
networks, in particular linking islands to mainland power
grid
Installation of new control system for interconnected
electricity generation and transmission grid
Extension and modernisation of network
Extension and upgrading of network
Upgrading and extension of facilities in Sardinia
Extension of network
Extension and upgrading of network
OIL AND NA TURAL GAS
Terminal at Zeebrugge for handling Norwegian natural
gas and gasline to Blaregnies (French border)
Oil pipeline linking fields in Danish sector of North Sea
with terminal at Fredericia; gasline from Torslunde and
gas storage facility at Stenlille
Natural gas transmission and distribution network















































Gaslines linking present gas system in Thuringia and
Saxony to European natural gas network
Construction of transmissiOrl and distribution network
Extension of natural gas transmissibn network
Laying second gasline between Algeria, Tunisia and Italy:
Mazara del Vallo - Messina (Sicily), Palmi (Calabria) -
Oricola (Abruzzi) sections and across Strait of Messina
Extension of three underground natural gas storage
reservoirs
Distribution networks in Dublin, Cork, Waterford
Limerick and Clonmel
Construction of riaturalgas interconnector between
Scotland (Moffat) and Ireland (Ballough, north of Dublin)























Individual loans provided by the EIB, from own resources, from 1988 to 1993
in support of networks of Community interest plus associated links
(ECU million)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1988-1993
, Total in the Member States 1 719. 2 453. 2 685. 4 163, 5 307, 6 870. 23 198,
rransport 958. 1 247. 995. 605. 406. 407. 10 620,
Rail 2238 514, 557, 1 060, 9362 938, 4 231 0
Roads and motorways 4045 434. 2926 280, 1 097 2 2040, 4 550 2
Ports 32, 129, 36.4 65, 81 3 81, 4257
Airports and air traffic control 292, 163, 98, 184, 284.4 321, 1 345,
Intermodal freight centres 144 25, 686
relecommunications 318. 651. 200. 1 679. 901.4 094. 7845,
~e~y s~po/ and d~mbuMn 442, 554.4 489. 877.4 999, 369. 4 732,
Electricity 218.2 227.7 3842 3585 591 1 7805
all and natural gas 4427 336.2 262, 4932 640. 777 1 2 952 0
Jf  which in assisted areas 6879 504, 21814 33733 3 877 9 5 933 7 1 7 558 7
II. Total outside the Member States
tneighbouring and Central and Eastern 495. 223. 432. 272, 278. 710. 2412,
European countries)
Transport 210. 58. 202. 120. 541. 1 131,
Rail 58. 22, 2470 3270
Roads and motorways 210, 180, 50, 240, 680,
Airports and air traffic control 700 540 1240
Telecommunications 285. 165. 215.4 272. 158. 110. 207.
Energy supply and distribution 15. 58, 73,
Electricity 15, 58, 735
TOTAL I
loans in support of networks of 2 214. 2677. 3117. 4 435. 5 585. 7 580. 25610.
Community interest4-2.~ Annex 6
OPTIONS FOR TENs FINANCING THROUGH
COMMUNITY lOAN AND GUARANTEE MECHANISM
Introduction
All financial options described hereafter bear abC-edit risk which - in case of
default of the beneficiary - could have considerable c~nsequences for the EC
budget and the financial perspectives.
These options are based on the assumption that they would be sufficiently
security backed to qualify for a " " entry in the Community budget. Otherwise
they would necessitate an appropriate budgetary protection.
Interventions through loans
Using its existing experience to raise money on the capital markets, upon
request from the Member States sponsoring the projects and after
appropriate consultation with the Council, the EC could contribute to the
funding of the financial gap. The proceeds would be onlent but only to
projects cofinanced with the E18; the loans themselves would be
managed by the EIB under a cooperation agreement to be negotiated.
As far as the financing of those interventions which are not funded by the
budget, the EC with its AAA rating is unlikely to meet difficulties in raising
sufficient volumes on the capital markets.
The EClike other providers (including the EIB and other development
banks), will require adequate, but not privileged "security" to ensure that
the ultimate repayment of the debt incurred does not fall on the
Community budget.
There is an already existing precedent with the NClloans and borrowings
which were aimed to finance within the Community mostly private projects
guaranteed by adequate securities and which appear as " " in the
budget.
In order to accomplish the same result and taking into account the specific
nature of the TEN projects, the intervention of the EC for projects located
within the limits of the European Union could be envisaged under the
following options:
One option is where Member States wish primarily to benefit from
the intermediation of the EC to lower the cost of their funding (similar
to BOP lending), In this case the EC will simply require a
Government guarantee and treat, from a budgetary standpoint, the
risk of default as a "
. ,
This option has no real advantage for
Governments able to borrow on equal terms with the EC.4-S'
The second option, of more general interest to public and private
entities promoting some of th~ projects, covers cases where
through structuring the loan covenants appropriately, the EC may
consider the undertakings of the promoter as the economic
equivalent of a Member State guarantee, qualifying thereby for a
similar " pudgetary treatment.. The promoter can consider its
obligation as\ a "contingent liability , not counting for instance, in
Government Debt" figure in the case of public entities.
The exact structure would have to be carefully put together, but the
general idea is that the promoter would make undertakings to
enable the project to meet its obligations, even if the results of the
exploitation are not those expected. For instance:
the promoter may guarantee the use of the new installations at
the level required to generate the appropriate resources, or
complement the revenues if necessary.
the promoter may undertake to maintain the net worth of the
operating company to enable it to pay its debt.
the promoter may pledge resources coming from other assets
(or tax revenues in the case of a public project) in cases where
projected revenues are insufficient to meet the debt service.
the promoter may if the exploitation of the project is conceded
pledge ancillary concession revenues for the debt service of
the project.
A third option would apply to situations where adequate first class
guarantees are provided to protect the Community s interests, for
instance, as experienced in the NCI mechanism where most of the
loans were backed by first class commercial bank guarantees.
Interventions through loan guarantees
Title 12 of the Treaty refers to the possibility of Community action taking
the form of a guarantee to TEN projects.
These options would consist of a guarantee to the finance institutions
making a loan which is given to the project itself, thus allowing the
beneficiary to achieve better lending conditions. The granting of such
guarantees would enhance the possibility of promoting projects of
common interest within the European Union which may not otherwise find
adequate risk coverage in the market through normal sources,
EC guarantee would be granted only to projects in which the EIB .is
participating and in consultation with the EIB and the ElF, The guarantee
could in principle be granted to the EIB itself, but the main objectives4-Ly -
should be to encourage private finance. The following conditions would
apply:
Access to other potential providers of guarantees is insufficient.
A minimum required economic rate of return is to be achieved by the
project.
Loan guarantees are subject to a ceiling of, for instance, 20% of the
private risk coverage or differenciated according to circumstances.
A loan guarantee from the EC would have the following advantages:
Credit enhancement: the EC takes over (a certain share of) the risk
and thereby allows the debtor to raise larger amounts on the market
and at better financial conditions based on the EC' s triple A rating.
The risk for other lenders and, as a result, the cost for the debtor
would be reduced.
Flexibility: regarding the time taken to complete a transaction, a
loan guarantee offers real advantages of flexibility, given the smaller
number of parties involved. Furthermore, a guarantee scheme
allows the EC to cover, for instance, a greater share of the risk
during the more critical construction period and start-up phase and
in a later stage, to gradually hand back the risk to the private
operators of the project.
The final risk of a loan guarantee does not differ from that of a direct
funding operation and could be treated as a " " in the budget
according to the same conditions as'described in ~ 1 above.